THE PRUDENT LAYPERSON STANDARD-Bridging the Gap Between
EMTALA and MCO Review of Emergency Utilization

Pilar Vaile
Advisor: Rob Schwartz
27 January 2000

Submitted in partial completion of the requirements for the degree of Juris Doctor.

S~/-/aib
(,a,

. :.

., ~ : ; , r . : r ~

The L;ti~versi;/of i i e w Mexico
11 7 7 Steniord Drive, .N.E.
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87137-1441

I. INTRODUCTION.
The past 50 years have seen a dramatic and widespread democratization in the
availability of healthcare in the United States. Nonetheless, this process has been &aught
with public dissatisfaction and outcry. For the past ten years public controversy has
focused on the issues of (1) access to emergency medical care, and (2) accountability of
the new delivery systems, managed care organizations (MCOs). As will be shown, these
controversies have grown directly out of the legislative solutions of yesterday, interacting
within a new healthcare finance economy. Worse, the solutions of yesterday have
stymied m e r reform by freezing a distortive status quo that allows insurers, especially

MCOs, to escape liability and accountability.
As a brief example of the interplay between healthcare legislation and the
changing heatthcare finance market, consider the following. The last call for major
legislative reform of healthcare began as recently as the late 1960s. Then the problem was
escalating healthcare costs. Consumers, i.e. patients, initially appeared to have "won"
with such legislation as The Federal HMO Act of 1973', and the Employment Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).~
The Federal HMO Act sought to encourage the growth and development of health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), a type of MCO, on the MCO promise to increase
access to basic care and decrease costs by preventing over-treatment. ERISA encouraged
large multi-state employers to provide health and welfare benefits to emptoyees (for

' 42 U.S.C. 8 300e to e17.
29 U.S.C. $9 1001-1461.

example through the new, low-cost delivery system being formulated) by preempting
conflicting state administration requirements.3 That these tended to create new problems
of their own upon interaction, however, become clear with the 1985 passage of the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA)? and the tortuous evolution
MCO-related jurisprudence during the same time.

In replacing the fee-for-service model with a model that contracts for minimum
care and shifts the risk of excess care unto providers, the widespread use of HMOs
decreased the ability of healthcare providers to subsidize the care of indigents, uninsureds
and underinsureds by increasing prices paid by insured patients. Because the cost of
treating such patients could no longer be subsidized by insured patients, an emergent
practice developed among emergency facilities to "dump" indigent patients onto other
facilities, or simply deny emergency medical treatment to such patients. Accordingly,

EMTALA was passed to provide that emergency facilities must provide appropriate
screening and stabilization to any patient presenting to the facility with an emergency
medical condition.

3

ERISA includes two separate types of preemption:
a. Complete preemption: !j 502 (29 U.S.C. $ 1132(a)), ERTSA's civil enforcement scheme, has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to provide the exclusive remedy for actions based on the improper
processing of claims for benefits, and to thus provide for complete preemption and removal to federal
court. See e.& Pilot Lifelns. Co. v. Dedeaux, 48 1 U.S. 41, 5 1-54 (1987).

b.

Conflict preemption: 8 5 14(a) (29 U,S.C.
3 1144(a)) provides for the preemption and dismissal of
"any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefits plan.. .."
"Relate to" has been interpreted very broadly by the Supreme Court, on the basis of plain meaning
and legislative history, see k h . See e.g. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).

C.

42 U.S.C.9 1395 et seq. EMTALA was one part of a larger Act, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA),having a number of provisions relating to health care access.

Meanwhile, federal and state courts grappled with the legal obligations of the new
entities, MCOs generally as well as HMOs, in the context of EMTALA and ERISA.
Early on it was held that EMTALA only imposed an obligation upon emergency care
facilities or hospitals, not upon ~

~

0 Atsthe. same
~ time, ERISA's preemption

provisions were interpreted broadly by the courts. As a general rule, any state legislation
attempting to secure minimum healthcare benefits is potentially threatened with ERISA
preemption, while ERISA has no substantive provisions regarding healthcare as an
employee benefit.6

As the foregoing example indicates, the problems seen in healthcare today are best
understood as having arisen as unintended consequences of competing legislative
solutions conceived in the early 1970s, whose implications are only now being fully
understood. This paper will begin by examining the shR from indemnification health
insurance to managed care organizations. The new federal regulatory regimes regarding
healthcare created two "regulatory vacuums'" in the context of an industry-wide shift in
the economic market of healthcare finance.

See e.g. Dearmas v. AV-Med Im., 814 F.Supp. 1103, 1108 (S.D. Fla. 1993). It has also been held that
EMTALA does not impose obligations upon individual physicians. Cf. Baber v. Hospital C o p of
America, 977 F.2d 872, 877 (4LhCir. 1992); Howe v. Hull, 873 F.Supp. 70,71 (W.D.. Ohio 1994);
Richarbon v. Southwest Miss. Regional Med. Ctr., 794 F.Supp. 198,200 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Delaney v.
Cade, 756 F.Supp 1476, 1486-87 (D.Kan. 1991).
For general background on ERISA preemption in the context of MCOs, see Deborah S. Davidson,
Balancing the Interests ofstate Healthcare Refom and Uniform Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA, 53
Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 203 (1998); Brooks Richardson, Preemption & HMO Liability: A Fresh
Look at ERlSA in the Context ofsubscriber Claims against HMOs,490 Oklahoma L Rev 677 (1996); and
Larry J Pittman, ERlSA 's Preemption Clause & The Healthcare Industy: An Abdication ofJudicial LawCreating Authorig, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 355 (1994).
7

See Davidson, supra note 6, at 204 and n. 12. Davidson notes that this term was coined by one of the
original drafters of ERISA, regarding ERISA's preemptive effect on health care law.

The first vacuum created was that between the requirements of EMTALA and the
obligation of MCOs. On one hand, EMTALA imposes an obligation on emergency
facilities to appropriately screen and stabilize any presenting patient.8 On the other hand,
as noted, no parallel obligation is imposed on MCOs. The structure of the MCO, based

on cost-containment and utilization review, operates to take advantage of this gap.
Accordingly, MCOs have denied emergency care reimbursement when laypersons misdiagnosed the severity of their condition, or where they suffered an emergency medical
condition but failed to get prior authorization for emergency services.

A common response by states to this gap has been to institute a "prudent
layperson" (PLP)standard, which provides that an emergency medical condition is one
that,
"manifests itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain)
such that the average prudent layperson, who possesses an average knowledge of
health and medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical
attention to result in
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) sel-ious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfimction of any bodily organ or part."9
This paper will examhe the consensus that has emerged behind the prudent
layperson standard, whether the standard is intended to represent our old fiend, the
objective "reasonable person" standard, and the economic implications and consequences
of the prudent layperson standard.
B

See In Re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4' Cir. 1993) (held EMTALA applies to any patient, in context of

anencephalic infant).
See e.g. M.D.Code Ann. Health-General 11, 4 19-701(d)(1996), the first state PLP statute, and 42 U.S.C.
4 1395~-22(d)(3)(B)and !j 1395~-2,
the federal Balanced Budget Act of 1997 regarding Medicare+

Choice, which was based on tbe Maryland statute.

Unfortunately, the second vacuum created, that between ERTSA preemption and
substantive ERISA provisions, today threatens any state law seeking to regulate MCOs.
MCOs have come to provide insurance to 75-80% of ~ m e r i c a n and
s ~ today half of all
Americans have health benefits through ERISA-governed employee benefit plans.1'
However, ERISA's substantive provisions only deal with retirement income,I2while it
has been broadly interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to preempt any state law related,
even indirectly, to employee benefit plans.'3 Accordingly, this paper will also analyze
EFUSA preemption jurisprudence to date, to determine the likelihood of federal
preemption of state prudent layperson laws. Analysis will demonstrate that no state effort
,

can be clearly secure fiorn federal preemption in today's confused legal environment.
Thus, I will conclude by forecasting that only uniform, nationally mandated benefits or an
amendment to ERISA permitting state health care standards or causes of action can
correct the problems of MCO accountability regarding emergency medical care and
federal preemption.

lo See Vickie Yates Brown and Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed Care at the Crossroak: Can Managed
Care Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7 Annals of Health L. 25, 26-27 (1998).
I'

See Richardson, supra note 6, at 689-90.
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Athough the Supreme Court, in Shuw,
note 3, at 91, has found ERISA to be comprehensive as to
both employee pension plans and employee benefit plans, this is plainly not so, as evidenced by the Court's
own description of ERISA: 'The statute imposes participation, funding, and vesting requirements on
pension plans.. ..It also sets various uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting, disclosure,
andfiduciaty responsibility, for both pension and welfare plans." (cites omitted, emphasis added). The
standards described simply provide no recourse for the problems seen today with MCOs.

2.

l3 S e e s a w ,
See also Meh-opolikzn Li(e Ins Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S.724,739(1985), incorporating the
rule of Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhaften,Inc., 45 1 U.S. 504,525 (198l),that even indirect impact "relates to"
and is preempted. However, it is not clear that that was an appropriate incorporation. Alessi concerned
pensions and direct conflict with federal objectives by outlawing a method of calculation legal under the

11. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY-The

shift

from an indemnification model to the MCO model.
Health insurance arose during the 1930s, in response to the Great Depression.
During this time physicians and hospitals were forced by dwindling receipts to solicit
sales more actively, by organizing health maintenance programs to provide basic
healthcare for a small monthly premium.'4 Concurrently, New Deal legislation created
the legal environment for improved employment stability, and hence better labor
bargaining power and increased employee benefits, such as healthcare insurance. Shortly
thereafter, encouraged by this new lucrative market, private insurance companies began to
enter the field and health insurance as we know it arose.15 The industry advanced along
with the rest of the American economy through the wartime manufacturing boom of the
second quarter of the century. Between 1930 and post-World War 11, insured Americans
had increased fiom near 0 to 63%.16 At this time, healthcare was provided on a fee-forservice basis and the patient sought reimbursement from his or her insurance.
~ e s p i t the
e general democratization of health insurance, considerable complaint

and dissatisfaction with the healthcare industry arose by late 1960s. Costs were
escalating rapidly due to increased insurance utilization, increased technological

federal scheme. Furthermore, Shaw had already recogmzed that Alessi was inapposite for normal 514(a)
analysis. 463 U.S. at 98, n. 15.
l4 See Richardson,
note 6, at 681-683. For example the Farmer's Union in Oklahoma formed the CoopKalth Association in 1929. At about the same, the American Hospital Association developed Blue
Cross plans.

l6

Id.

sophistication, longer longevity, and the general economic inflation of the period.'7 By
the 1970s there was considerable call for reform and managed care was embraced because
of its cost-containment principles.l 8
Managed care is a type of healthcare delivery system where attempt is made to
control costs by controlling the provision of services. By controlling enrollees' access to
services, MCOs can offer broader access to healthcare. This creates further economic
incentives independent of cost-containment. Employers are more willing to contract with
MCOs for the provision of employee welfxe benefit plans because all their employees
will be accepted. This eases administration and lowers costs. Additionally, healthcare
providers are more willing to contract with MCOs because MCOs can guarantee them a
large consumer base from which to determine compensation.
The two main types of managed care organizations are Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs) and.Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOS).'~PPOs are an
offshoot of the traditional heaIth indemnity model, operating on a traditional fee-forservice basis. The insurance company contracts with physicians andlor hospitals for
lower rates. Then, both physician and insurance are paid on the basis of the number of
services performed and amount of each. Patients do not have to use a particular
17

I
d
- at 683-684. For exampIe, "[nlational spending for health care increased fiom $12.7 billion to $41.9
billion in 1965 to $647 billion in 1990. Likewise, per capita spending for medical services skyrocketed
fi-om$82 per year in 1950 to $2 1 1 in 1965 to $25 1 1 in 1990." Id.,at 683.
Regarding the history of MCOs, see David A. Hyrnan, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World,
43 Villanova Law Review 409 (1998);Richardson, suora note 6. Regarding their cost-containment
mechanisms, see Ryan L. Everhart, New York Managed Care Legislation.. A Substantive Response to
Corporate Medicine or Q Token Gesture to Ease Consumer Concern?, 46 Buffalo L Rev 507, 509 (1998);
Michael Misocky, The Patient's Bill of Rights-Managed Care Under Seige, 15 J, Contemp. Health L. &
Pol'y 57,61 (1998);Brown and H m g ,

note 10.

The following descriptions are gotten fiom Richardson, anote 6, at 685-687, except where otherwise
noted,
19

physician, but are encouraged to. Although there is some controversy as to the legal
responsibility of PPOs, there is not near so much as with HMOs.
HMOs are the most the most prevalent and controversial form of managed care
organizations. They are marked by a controlled structure based on the essential goal of
cost-containment. First, HMOs eliminate physician incentives to over-treat by shifting
the risk to the medical provider, through incentives such as withholds20and capitation.21
Second, the patient's assigned primary care physician acts as a gatekeeper to restrict the
patient's fi-eedom to self-select certain forms of treatment and services.
While MCOs appear to have been regarded with some suspicion initially,22
managed care's market share grew dramatically through the 1980s and 1990s. Today 75-

80% of Americans are covered by M C O S and
~ ~ on third of all Americans are covered by
~

~

0

s

.

~

~

111. THE IMPETUS TOWARDS REFORM OF MANAGED CARE.

20 Where the HMO holds a percentage (usually 10-15%) of the provider's payment and uses it to cover
"excess" referrals. Alternately, any balance will be returned to the provider

Where payment per contract depends on the number of members that can be enrolled (the provider's
defined population) for the provider's services.

2'

22

See e.g. Brown and Hartung,-note
10, at 26. Despite the perceived market failure of fee-for-service
and the Federal HMO Act, MCO and HMO enrollment continued to be low until early 1980s. For example,
by 1979, only 5% of Americans were enrolled in HMOs.
See note 10,
-

and accompanying text.

"See Richardson, supl-a.note 6, at 688; furthermore, enrollment has increased by 60% just since 1991.

Despite, the economic success of managed care, it has now come under public fire

in its own turn. The major complaints against managed care are twofold: (1) their
aggressive and inappropriate cost-containment; and (2) their ability to escape
accountability for mandating healthcare decisions through ERISA's preemption
provisions.
First, consumers have come to question the wisdom of the very thing that gave

MCOs a market edge, namely their emphasis on the bottom line and aggressive costcontainment. Without legislative restraint, MCOs have become "tyrannical" in their costcontainment.2s The objectionable practices are legion. Lump sum payments to
physicians, regardless of the number of patients seen or the cost of careltreatment,
encourage physicians to limit treatment. Requirements of specialty referral and
emergencylurgent care pre-authorization, as well as physician incentives for limiting
referral quotas, all tend to discourage referrals for care that the primary care doctor cannot
provide. The policy of "gagging" physicians prevents them fiom speaking of alternate
procedures not offered by the MCO. Finally, clinical rules such as utilization review,
treatment protocols, and practice guidelines allow MCOs to actually dictate modes of
treatment.
The second source of the public resentment toward managed care is the
unintended reaction between managed care and ERISA. While the issue of costcontainment concerns a direct structural characteristic of managed care, ERISA was not

"See Misocky, supra note 18, at 57. But see Hyman,

note 18, at 457. Hyman warns that most of the
calls for reform are based on "anecdotal evidence," and hence unreliable. However, dissatisfaction with
MCOs js also based on verifiable contract provisions, and more than twenty years of judicial, administrative
and legislative hearings regarding managed health care.

written with managed care in mind and its impact within a new healthcare economy was
completely accidental.
ERISA has aggravated consumer frustration with managed care in three ways.
First, 5 502 provides an exclusive remedy that is ineffectual in the context of managed
care. Second, ERISA's substantive provisions do not address healthcare. Finally, ERISA
preemption through 5 502 and 5 5 14(a) acts as a barrier to state reform efforts.
The only causes of action that § 502 of ERISA provides beneficiaries is to
"recover benefits due.. .under the terms of [the] plan" or "to enforce,. .rights under the
terms of the plan."26 This limited remedy is a result of ElUSA having been written in
light of the old fee-for-service model.27 When ERISA was enacted, patients paid for
medical services and were then reimbursed by insurer. Because a patient was to seek
medical treatment first, and then reimbursement, there was never any danger of damages
greater than reimbursement. Accordingly, an exclusive remedy of reimbursement of the
cost of service was adequate at that time.
Today, however, the fee-for-sewice model no longer represents the majority of
health insurance relationships. As noted above, 75-80% of Americans are covered by
MCOs, a third are covered by HMOs, and half have healthcare benefits through ERISA
governed employee benefit plans.28 In light of the attractiveness of managed care to
employers, also noted above, the overlap between managed care plans and ERISAcovered plans could be near complete.
26
27

5 502(a)(l)(B),

29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(l)(B).

See e x . Greg Otterson, Medical Malpractice for Texas HMOs:

L.Rev. 799,840 (1998).

The End ofa 'CharmedLife'?, 39 S. Tex.

Thus, the healthcare finance industry has reshaped itself almost entirely, so that
the structure and nature29of the most prevalent type of health insurance model requires
insurers to decide prospectively whether to pay for medical care. Now, incorrect
assessment can lead to further injury or even death, since medical care is being denied
beforehar~d.~~
Section $502 remedies, however, are useless in the case of injury or death

as an enrollee can only sue for cost of services denied, not the resulting injury, death, or
economic ioss caused by the deniaL3'
Furthermore, the substantive provisions of ERISA do not deal with healthcare so
that, in addition to the lack of remedy, there are no federal laws governing employee
health benefit plans. The purpose of ERISA was to provide for uniformity in the
administration of pension plans and the payment of benefits.32 Accordingly, substantive
provisions are directed to pension administration and concomitant fiduciary obligations of
plan administrators. In the absence of regulation or penaIty, most MCOs have rationally
chosen to continue to contain costs aggressively.

In response to this gap in the federal regulatory scheme and rising consumer
dissatisfaction, most states have recently sought to reform the regulation of health
insurance to make MCOs more accountable, and to improve access to the contracted for

28

See 10, 11 and 214, su~ra.and accompanying text.

29

Through use of prior authorization, pre-certification, the limiting of referrals, etc.

30

See Otterson,
-

note 27, at 840.

See Michael Higgins, Texas Law Allow Patients to Sue--HMO Waging Preemption Battle, 83 ABA J
24(l)(sep 1997). See also Pilot Lve, suora note 3, at 50 (that 6 502 does not provide express or implied
authority for an award of punitive damages).
3'

32 See Mms.

v. Morash, 490 US 107, 115 (1989). See also Pittman,XSJU

note 6, at 358.

medical care. Forty-five (45) states have enacted 56 laws from over 1,000 bills,
providing for some type of "consumer protection" targeting ~

~

0 Most
s of
. the
~ state
~

laws have been geared toward mandating minimum benefits, patient protection
mechanisms, or claims processing protocols. A number have also been directed toward
creating a statutory causes of action against ~

~

0 The
s need
. for
~ reform
~
has also been

recognized at the federal level, as seen in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 regarding
~edicare?' and a flurry of legislative proposals.36
Despite this consensus, however, both state legislative efforts and state common
law tort and breach of contract causes of action have often been held to be preempted
under ERISA, bringing us to the third way in which ERISA frustrates the goal of MCO
accountability.
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended ERISA to
preempt the entire field of employee benefit

including employee health benefit

note 19, at 426; Michele Bitoun Blecher, et
note 10, at 31; Hyman, su~ra
33 See Brown and Hartung,
al.,omp.,
Hospitals & Health Networks 1998; 72(16): 12-14, 16.
Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Ann. 5 88.002(a) (that an enrollee can sue an MCO if it does not
exercise the degree of care that an MCO of ordinary prudence would exercise) (upheld as not preempted in
12 F.Supp.Zd 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998)); New Mexico Stat. Ann. 5 59(A)-57-9(c) (codifjmg common law right
of enrolIees to sue MCOs for breach of contract, if MCO violated a provision of New Mexico's Patient
Protection Act). See also Missouri Ann. Stat. 5 354.505 (repealed state law providing that MCOs do not
practice mehcine, which facilitates medical malpractice claims against MCOs).
" See e.g.

3s

See note 9,
and accompanying text. The prudent layperson standard defines medical emergency
conditions in terms of the prudent layperson perspective and usually forbids prior authorization
requirements.
36

See e.g. S. 356 $981 (Access to Emergency Medical Service Act; Norwood I); S. 373m.R.820
(Kennedymingell); S. 1712 (JefforddLieberman); H.R. 1415 (Patient Access to Responsible Care Act); HR
3605 $ 101. See also President Clinton's Commission's Patient Bill of Rights, from 1998.
37 See notes 3, 12 and 13, m. However, these earlier holdings may be relaxing today, as the Court
moves away from it original, strict textual interpretation of ERISA, and begins to consider the actual impact
of state law on the purposes of ERISA. See e.K Fort HaI@ v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), and N. Y. State
Conference ofBCBS v. Travelers Ins, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995), which direct courts to look to the objectives

plans such as MCOs and HMOs. Since the early 1980s, federal courts have held a
number of state law claims directed against MCOs to be so preempted. The majority of
healthcare-related cases have dealt with state laws seeking to hold MCOs tiable for
fiaud andlor
injuries caused by denial of medical care, such as breach of ~ontract,~'
rni~re~resentation,~~
breach of fiduciary care," tortious interference with contractual
relations:'

negligence,42and malpractice.43 Federal courts have also held that state "any

willing provider statutes" are preempted under E R I S A . ~ ~
Because ERISA is likely to be found to preempt both legislative and common law
causes of action or remedies, commentators argue that a complete legal vacuum exists
today as regards the duties and liabilities of ~ ~ 0 s . ~ '

LV. THE PRUDENT LAYPERSON STANDARD-A

case study on the practical

difficulties created by EMTALA and ERISA.

of the state law and ERISA to determine if there is m e conflict. The final result is not clear as of yet,
though, as evidenced in subsequent confirsion in lower courts, discussed &, Part N.D.
38

See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298,302 (8" Cir. 1993).

See Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 509 (lo* Cir. 1991); Elsesser v. Hospital ofphila.
college of Osteopathic Med., 802 F.Supp. 1286,1292 (E.D.
Pa. 1992).

39

*
4'

Santitoro v. Evans, 935 F.Supp. 733,736 (E.D.N.C.
1996)

See Kuhl,

note 38, at 302.

42

See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5h Cir.1992)

43

See J a n v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7' Cir.1996); Dukes v. United States
z Care
h Systems, 88 F.Supp. 39,42 (E.D.Pa. 1994), rev'd sub nom 57 F.3d 50 (3d Cir. 1995).

~
44

See CIGNA Health Plan, Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642 (5' Cir. 1996); Texas Pharmacy Ass 'n v.
~TuTentiai~ns.Co., 105 F.3d 1035 (5LbCir.1997).
See e.q. Davidson, supra note 6, and note 7

A. Impetus Toward Reform of Emergency Care Utilization Review.
The prudent layperson standard has been the second most popular state patient
protection measure enacted by states recently. 46 Thirty-one (3 1) states and the District of
Columbia provide for use of the PLP standard in some situations. Eight of these states
have passed laws ensuring coverage for all emergency services defined by the prudent
layperson star~dard.~'The remaining states and the District of Columbia have passed
laws providing for the use of the prudent layperson standard under certain conditions,
such as for reimbursement of out-of-area emergency services, or when prior authorization
is not required. Additionally, electronic research reveals that 29 federal bills proposing a
prudent layperson standard were introduced in the 105'~

and 13 bills have

been introduced in the 106'~Congress to date.49 Finally, the prudent layperson standard is
included in the AMA's model contract.50
This broad consensus is not surprising when it is estimated that as much as 60%
of managed care coverage disputes may involve emergency medical care." The reason

See Blecher et al, sut>ra note 33 (bans on physician gag rules are the most popular measure, enacted in 45
statesand D.C.).

46

47

See ex. M.D. Code Ann. Health-General 11, § 19-701(d)(1996), the fust state PLP statute, enacted in
1993 ;ArkCode Ann. 5 20-9-903(c)(l) (Michie 1995); GA Code Ann. 5 33-20A-3(2) (1981); VA Code
Ann. 8 32.2-4300 (1996); Mo. Stat. Ann.354400; N.Y. Ins. Law 5 3221(k)(4)@); Ill. Cornp. Stat. Ann. 9
50/3.5; New York Ins. Law 8 3216(1)(9); and Texas Ins. Art. 3-70-3c.
48

See note 36, -,
-

49

See S. 517; H.R. 904; S. 636; H.R.1133; H.R.448; H.R. 719; S.240; S.6; H.R. 358; S.326; S.374; S.300;

for the most well-known.

~ . E 1 6 .

See Huff,Charlotte, Contract Balk: Physicians Angered Over Managed Care Contracis, Hospitals &

~ealthNetworks 1998; 72(8): 36-36.

*'See July 27, 1995 testimony of Richard C. Aghababian, M.D., President, American College of

Emergency Physicians, House Was and means Health Plus Under Medicare, WL 4467 10, cited in
Christopher J. Young, Emergency! Says Who?: Analysis of the Legal Issues Concerning Managed Care
and Emergency Medical Services, 13 J . Contemp. H.L. & Pol'y 553, 579, n. 1 (1997): "Wtule testikng

coverage for emergency services is so hotly contested appears to stem from the
divergence between the standard imposed on emergency facilities by EMTALA, and the
definitions used by MCOs in after-the-fact review.52
Imagine two common instances in which emergency service coverage is denied by
MCOs. In the first situation, an older, high-risk patient has severe chest pains and thinks
he is having a heart attack. At the emergency room, he is diagnosed with indigestion.
Later, the MCO refuses to pay for the emergency services provided because it was
determined, after the fact, to not be an emergency. In the second situation, a patient is in
a severe car crash and an mbulance rushes her to the nearest emergency room where she
is admitted for surgery without first obtaining prior authorization. Later, the insurance
refuses to pay $40,000.00 of the bill because the patient didn't first obtain prior
authorization.

EMTALA provides that emergency facilities receiving Medicare funding are to
provide appropriate screening and stabilization to patients presenting to the facility with

an "emergency medical condition," defined as one,
"manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe
pain) such that the absence of medical attentions could reasonably be expected to
result in
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dyshction of any bodily organ or part.. ."53
about the problems concerning emergency medical care hthe age of managed care, [Dr. Aghababian
stated] that 40%of the disputes of Medicare involved "in-area" emergency care, while another 20%were
for "out-of-area"emergency care."
See e.n. Diane E. HoEmergency Care and Managed Care-A Dangerous Combination, 72
Wash.L. Rev. 315 (1997); Joan Stieber and Linda J. Spar, EMTALA in the '90s-Enforcement Challenges,
8 Wealth Matrix 57 (1998).
52

" 42 USC

1395dd(e)(l).

EMTALA was intended to ensure universal access to emergency medical care by
providing that emergency facilities cannot deny treatment to indigent or uninsured
emergency patients, or endanger an emergency patient's health by requiring priorauthorization before treatment. However, the Act only speaks to the responsibility of
emergency service providers. Accordingly, MCOs can shift risk and costs to medical
providers by denying payment to hospital when the medical condition is later found not to

As with ERTSA, this appears to be another unintended consequence of legislation
passed before the full implications of managed care were assessed. It is unlikely that

Congress intended to implicitly shift costs to public service providers and reward MCOs
for the breach of their contractual obligations.

In response, a number of states have passed similar legislation defining a "medical
emergency condition" as one which,
"rnanifest[s] itself by acute symptoms of severity (including severe pain) such that
the average prudent layperson, who possesses an average knowledge of health and
medicine, could reasonably apect the absence of immediate medical attention to
result in
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part."55
Because EMTALA spoke in terms of "appropriate" screening and stabilization, it
is clear that emergency service providers cannot abdicate all medical evaluation authority.

54

See e.a. Denmas,

note 5 , at 1108.

Nonetheless, physicians are constrained by their necessary reliance on second hand
information, and must screen and stabilize according to symptoms relayed to them.
Accordingly, the language "such that the average prudent.. .could reasonably expect the
absence of immediate medical attention to result in.. ." simply emphasizes that the
determination of whether a patient should have presented hmself to an emergency
department for appropriate screening and stabilization shall be made fiom the patient's
perspective. The AMA model contract is in accord with this interpretation, as it provides
that "a reasonably prudent lay person' should initially determine what constitutes an
emergency. Once the patient is screened, the standard shifts to how the condition would
be classified by a reasonably prudent d~ctor.'"~
Similarly, the language Who possesses an average knowledge of health and
medicine" reemphasizes whose perspective is critical to this inquiry. It further guarantees
that patients are not to be held to the knowledge of medical professionals, in deciding to
seek emergency service.
For these reasons, commentators argue persuasively that the prudent layperson
standard was intended to "bridge the gap" between medical screening obligations
imposed by EMTALA and MCOs' contractual obligations to providers. "

55 See Stieber and Spar,
nore 52, at 76 (emphasis added). All the statutes, including the federal
B.B.A., and the federal bills cited in note 45 supra, track this language consistently, which in turn tracks the
language in EMTALA itself but for the addition in italics.
56

See Hospital & Health,

note 50.

57 See e.g. Stieber and.Spar,
note 52, at 76 (that such provisions are "clearly intended to bridge the
gap" between those sewices required under EMTALA, and those which MCOs are obligated to pay).

B. Is the PLP Standard a Restatement of the Objective "Reasonable Person"
Legal Standard?
Upon reading the prudent layperson standard, the first question that presents itself
is whether it is simply a restatement of our old fiend, the objective "reasonable person"
legal standard. This is a difficult question. No prudent layperson standard has been
adjudicated yet so it is unclear how courts will interpret it. However, analysis of the plain
language, legislative and administrative history, and other factors indicates that the PLP
would probably be as an objective standard.
The plain language of the provision, when read in its entirety, indicates an
objective standard. It could be argued that Iawmakers intended all prudent and reasonable
persons to monitor their health and seek emergency care if they believe the acuteness of
their symptoms, including pain:8

indicate a potentially serious threat to their health. The

policy behind such an interpretation would be that health care costs are mitigated with
timely care. However, this is an admittedly tortured reading of the statute. First, the
standard clearly speaks of "the average.. .layperson, who possesses an average knowledge
of health and medicine." Second, it expressly refers to reasonable expectations.

Legislative and administrative history also indicates an objective standard.
Although interpretations of the Medicare agency, the Health Care Finance Administration

(HCFA), and state legislatures could be said to point to a subjective standard, these
arguments are easily rebutted. First, the HCFA sought to add "Itom patient's

AS an interesting side note, MCOs fought the inclusion of pain, even qualified by "severe" for fear of
over-utilization. They argued that patients would seek emergency care for "stubbed toes" if pain was
included. However, commentators have pointed out that MCOs are particularly insensitive to the issue of
patient pain. For example, MCOs tend to under-prescribe pain meds for terminally ill patients.
s8

perspective" to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and later to the Presidents
administrative bill, The Patients' Bill of Rights, to avoid confusion with the legal
~tandard.'~That the attempted amendment was unsuccesshl, however, undercuts the
argument.
Second, it can be argued that HCFA regulations cumulatively give the impression
that claims reviewers are to look to the subjective determination of the patient, and direct
reviewers to look for evidence of the patient's subjective a~sessrnent.~~
HCFA
regulations specify that the determination of whether or not an emergency existed is to be
made at the time of service, to avoid putting enrollees in the unreasonable position of

making quasi-clinical evaluations. It is also recommended that evaluation consider
statements by the members that imply his or her lay assessment of an emergency medical
condition. This is a better argument than the first, but the regulations are probably still
better understood as specifying the type of proof of objective lay assessment preferred.
Finally, legislative history of the New York Health Care Coverage Protection Act
provides that the prudent layperson was intended to "allow for more reasonable errors" in
patients' asse~sments.~'However, the New York legislature also intended a "more
objective standard" to prevent MCOs from using their own, stricter definition of

5'

See e.g. Stieber and Spar,supra note 52, at 78.

See Hoffman, suwa note 52, at 407, n. 222, n. 238, and n. 24 1,
the following: David Richardson,
Network Design Group, HCFA Coop Agreement No. 17-C.90070/2-0 1, Study, Sep 1993, pg. 3-4 (agency
wanted to avoid putting enrollee in unreasonable position of makmg quasi-clinical evaluations of
condition); CCH Medicare & Medicaid Guide, P 13,960.22, at 5842 (HCFA regulations amended so that
emergency is determined at time of service, and claims are not to be retrospectively denied simply because
condition turned out to not be an emergency); June 1994 at 2, Reconsideration Notes, NDG (to consider
statements where member clearly indicated or implied his lay assessment).
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See Everhart,

note 18, at 532.

emergencya6*It would follow that, if the legislature intended to cabin subjective
determinations by MCOs, the same standard should apply to patients.
The remaining factors, the PLP's origin and its likely effects, provide mixed
support for an objective interpretation. As to origin, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
and the various state statutes are all based on the first prudent layperson standard, that of
Maryland. Maryland observes a strictly objective standard which it often calls the
'prudent layperson standard,' in its general contract law.63 This suggests that the PLP is
not a new subjective standard. Furthermore, as the originator of the prudent layperson
medical emergency standard, Maryland's interpretation should be extremely persuasive."
However, this argument is weak if all the acts, including the Maryland law, are really
based on EMTALA. The better argument is that the objective standard was selected to
avoid subjective determinations on part of MCOs.
As to effects, some commentators have argued that the prudent layperson standard
tends to be too subjective as it is,65and many or even most visits to an emergency
department are inappropriate.66 However, as will be explained below, the data is not
conclusive on this issue and statistics of inappropriate utilization actually range from

10.2% to 46%.

-

62 Id.

63

See Scott A. Conwell, Recent Decisions in the Maryland Court ofAppeals, 57 Maryland. L. Rev. 706,
728,n. 50.
Compare the influence of Illinois jurisprudence regarding Lung Arm Statutes.
65

See Hyman,

"Id., at 432.

note 18, at 441442.

On balance, prudent layperson legislation will probably be interpreted as an
objective standard. This conclusion is supported by plain language, history of the act,
logic and equitable considerations. However, this should not make an enormous
difference fiom the average patient's perspective. Today, medical care is so complicated
and specialized that the "average knowledge of health and medicine" is pretty minimal
and inaccurate. Thus, there is a "dumbing-down" of a standard based on the "average"
person, in the case of healthcare.

C. Economic Implications of the Prudent Layperson Standard.
As a general economic proposition it is clear that, all else being equal, increased
medical benefits and flexibility of use translates to greater insurance cost. This is
particularly significant in light of fact that MCOs had been popularized precisely for their
cost-containment abilities. However, it has not been established that the use of a prudent
layperson standard will dramatically increase costs, or the risk of inappropriate and overutilization of emergency facilities.
There are three separate factors that indicate that the prudent layperson standard
will not increase the healthcare costs of patients substantially, and further, will promote
economic efficiency.
First, there is no evidence that the use of the prudent layperson standard will
translate to a direct and substantial increase in insurance costs. When Medicare instituted
the prudent layperson standard under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, it did not appear
to have a significant effect on claims, as 78% of denials have been upheld under the new

standard.67 Furthermore, a study.by the health care finance organization Kaiser
Prorninente projects that the use of the prudent layperson standard will increase costs by
less than 1%, raising premiums by an additional $1.20 a year per insured person.68
Finally, there is criticism that the savings due f?om restricted access to emergency
services has not materialized, while patients are exposed to unnecessary riskm6'In terms
of industrial organizational economics, this is not surprising-large

indusdtxieswith

concentrated market power often simply absorb savings derived from economies of scale
as profits, because they can.
Second, the prudent layperson standard simply corrects inadvertent cost-shifting
effected by EMTALA. In so far as cost-shifting creates distortion, and restricts the
inability to determine the ideal allocation of resources and preferences, this must be
recognized as an economic benefit despite its intangible nature.
Finally, there is empirical data that suggests that the threat of inappropriate or
over-utilization has been exaggerated. First, whle some studies posit that 43%" to
46%71of the visits to emergency rooms are inappropriate, these figures include

undisclosed statistical outliers that should not be considered in evaluating the economic
impact of the prudent layperson standard. For example, omitting marginal or hard-to-

67

See Hofhann,

note 52, at 365.

68

News Brief, Study Finds Minor Premiwn Increase for Consumer Protection, Vol. 5 No. 10 Andrew
Health Law Litig.Rptr. 13 (May 1998).
69 See e.g. Thomas William Malone and Deborah Hass Thaler, Managed Health Care: A Plaintrfs
Perspective, 32 Tort & Ins. L.J. 123 (1996) (page 31 of West Law document).
70

See Robert M. Williams, M.D., The Cost of Visits to the Emergency Room, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 642,
a General Accounting Office estimate).
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See Hyrnan,

note 18, at 433, citing a 1996 study by the Journal of American Medicine Association.

distinguish cases reduces the value to 25 to 3 0 % . ~These
~
cases should rightly be
excluded from the sample because the prudent layperson standard seeks to minimize the
risk of forcing laypersons to make exactly this sort of quasi-clinical

evaluation^.^^

Similarly, omitting "sub-variations," or those classes of people lacking average

knowledge of,health and medicine, drops the value to 10.2%.'~ Since we have concIuded
that the. prudent layperson is intended as an objective standard, these cases should also be
excluded from the sanipIe because they would not be covered under the prudent layperson

standard.
Second, inappropriate utilization has not stemmed solely from irascible patients.
A study of emergency room utilization in Tennessee over the course of two summers
suggests that problems have stemmed fiom flaws in MCO prior-authorization procedures

as well. The study demonstrated that 37% of the emergency room patients did not have a
primary care doctor, or did not know his or her name, and that 40% of those who tried to
contact their primary care physician or other prior-authorization point-of-contact were

h conclusion, I submit that MCOs' mantra of "rising prices" is largely empty
rhetoric designed to frighten consumers and critics. While premiums will increase
somewhat, it looks to be by only a nominal amount. Furthermore, the risk of cost
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See Williams,

note 70.

See e.g. HCFA Cooperative Agreement No. 17-6.9007012-01,Sep 1993, p. 3-4, cited in H o w
note 63, at 407 n. 222 (that the agency wanted to avoid putting enrollee in the unreasonabIe position of
making a quasi-clinical evaluation of his condition).
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note 18, at n. 113,

BueshIing et al, 14 Annals of Emergency Med 672,672 (1985).

''Hospital & Health Networks 1997; 7 l(19): 30-2.

increases due to over-utilization appears to be equally inflated, and controllable by
improved prior-authorization protocols. Contraposed to these arguments by MCOs is the
undisputed facts of distortive and hence ineficient cost-shifting to providers and patients.

D. Will ERTSA Preempt State PLP Acts?
Despite the clear need for a prudent layperson standard, today such a standard
initiated by states is in danger of preemption under 5 502 and $ 5 14(a) of ERISA. The
basic ERISA preemption analysis that has evolved is not favorable to the prudent
layperson standard because it is directed to MCOs, while ERISA was written and has
been largely interpreted in the context of traditional insurance. Some of the problems
could be overcome if courts were to commit th'emselves to being more carefil with the
language they use, and to keeping in mind the prevalence of the managed care model.
However, it is unlikely that such a change could occur in time under the present state of
law, because lower court confusion has continued even when the Supreme Court has laid
down relatively clear rules.

1. Basic ERISA Preemption Analysis.
ERISA preemption analysis appears fairly straightforward and devastating to the
prudent layperson standard, providing four separate opportunities to find preemption.
First, under established reasoning, the prudent layperson standard is preempted because it
"relates to" employee benefit plans. Second, the PLP is unlikely to be "~aved,"'~at least
in some jurisdictions, as traditional state regulation of insurance because it is directed
76

§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1144@)(2)(A), Savings Clause (provides that "nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any State which regulates insurance, banking, or

securities").

toward MCOs rather than towards the "insurance industry." Third, assuming the PLP is
saved, the language of a number of cases suggests that it could be preempted under the
"deemer"77 clause. Finally, if claims brought under a prudent layperson standard are
viewed as claims based on improper processing, they will still be preempted under $502.
Section 514(a) provides for the preemption of "any and all State laws insofar as
they now or hereafler relate to any employee benefit plan." Under Shaw "relate to" has
been broadly interpreted on the basis of plain language and legislative history to mean
only that the law has a connection with or reference to such a plan.78 The reasoning
behind such extraordinarily expansive preemption power was that Congress was seeking
to "eliminate the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation,"79 and
had expressly rejected earlier bills that provided for preemption only of those state laws
conflicting with substantive provisions of ERISA.

77

$ 5 14(b)(2)(B),29 U.S,C.5 1144(b)(2)(B), Deemer Clause (provides that "[nleither an employee benefit
plan.. .nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer,. .or to be engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regdate insurance companies [and] insurance contracts").

.

78 See note 3, a,
at 96. But see Richardson, s u ~ r anote 6, at 694. While the Supreme Court read the
legislative record to provide unconditional support for broad preemption, Richardson informs us that
"[alfter passage, House and Senate Members disagreed on the desirability of the preemption clause." While
the House sponsor, Representative Dent, called the clause ERISA'a "crowning achievement" (120 Cong.
Rec., 29,197 (1974)), other members viewed it differently. For example, its sponsor in the Senate, Senator
Javits, suggested that the "desirability of firher [state] regulation" necessitated that fj 514(a) be refined
(120 Cong. Rec., 29,942). Additionally, Senator Harrison Williams, a co-sponsor, "suggested in no
uncertain terms that the preemption clause was obviously the result of interest group politics" (120 Cong.
Rec., 29,933).

79

See e.a. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974) (Statements by Representative Dent), cited in Shaw.

This broad interpretation of "relate to" has since been restricted in N. Y. State

Con$ Of BCBS v. Travelers h s . CO.~'

ow ever, the prudent layperson standard does

clearly relate to employee benefit plans, as it seeks to impose minimum standards of
access and administrative review on MCOs and HMOs, the vehicle of most ERISAcovered employment health benefit plans today.
Meanwhile, there are a number of problems in applying ERISA's savings clause
to state prudent layperson acts to avoid ENSA preemption, because such laws are
directed to MCOs as opposed to traditional insurers. As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Metropolitan Lge, the savings clause requires that state legislation meet the

.

following requirements." First, the legislation must regulate insurance in a "comrnonsense view." For example, Pilot Lqe found that bad faith claims did not meet this
threshold requirement, because the cause of action had its roots in common Law tort and
contract law, despite its formal identification with insurance. In contrast, Metropolitan
Lge found that state laws mandating minimum benefits did meet the "common sense"
test. It is not inconceivable, though, that some jurisdictions could find that the prudent
layperson standard fails on this account because it is directed to MCOs in particular,82or
because it is in reality a health law.83
5 14 U.S. 645 (1995) (holding that simple increase in the cost of administration alone, applicable whether
or not commercial insurance is obtained through an ERISA governed plan, does not constitute sufficient
"relation to" ERISA plans).

See note 13,

at 740-743.

*' For example, Pilot Life,

note 3, at 50, specified that "a law must not only have an impact on the
insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry."

83

Although this latter distinction was supposedIy disposed of by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life.

supra note 13, at 741, lower court confusion as to more clearly stated principles should warn us from being

too quick in presuming that an ERISA preemption question has been settled. See

Part IV.D.3.

Second, the legislation must regulate the "business of insurance," according to the
three factors enumerated in Union Labor Life Ins. Co.v.

iren no.^^ T h e law must be

regarding the spreading of risk, be related to the contract ox policy between the parties,

and its application must be limited to entities within the insurance industry.'85The only

Pireno factor that the prudent layperson standard clearly meets is that of relating to the
contract between parties, by specifying a statutory definition of "emergency medical
condition." The standard only spreads the risk of inaccurate layperson emergency
evaluation, rather than foreseeable risks of injury as envisioned in Pireno. Furthermore,
the PLP standard is not limited to traditional insurers, and is in fact directed toward
MCOs. This factor in particular, has been the death of state reform efforts in the Fifth

Even assuming the prudent layperson standard is saved, it could still be found to
regulate employee benefit plans "deemed" to be insurance companies or contracts for the
purpose of state regulation. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has only interpreted the
deemer clause to prohibit state regulation of self-funded employee benefit plans.87
However, the language of both the deemer clause and the Supreme Court's opinions
could support a broader rule.
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458 U.S. 1 19,129 (1982).

The factors have generally been understood in the conjunctive. However, both the Sixth and the Ninth
Circuits have rejected the requirement that all three Pireno factors be met. &Davies v. Centenial Life Ins.
Co, 128 F.3d 934,940 (6th Cir. 1997); Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 1998).
See e.g. CIGNA, supra note 55, and T e r n Pharmacy, supra note 55, regarding any willing provider
statutes.
87

See Metropolitan Life,
-

note 13, at 735, n. 14; FMC Cop,v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).

The clause specifies that "an employee benefit plan.. .shall [not] be deemed to be
an insurance company, or other insurer.. .or to be engaged in the business of insurance for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [and]
insurance contracts." In Metropolitan Life & Holiiday, the Supreme Court noted that this
clause prevents states from regulating employee benefit plans directly, and that such plans
can only be regulated indirectly through the regulation of insurance. This raises the
question of whether mandating minimum benefits to be provided by MCOs constitutes
regulation of insurance contracts or regulation of employee benefit plans.
Finally, assuming the prudent layperson standard is saved and not then preempted
under the deemer clause, it may still be preempted under § 502 if claims brought under a
prudent layperson standard are viewed as claims based on improper processing. For
example, in Pilot Life the Court found that a bad faith breach of contract claim was in
reality based on a claim of improper processing, despite its formal identification with
state insurance law.88 A claim under the prudent layperson could easily be recharacterized in a similar manner, because it is at bottom based on a claim of improper
denial of

benefit^.^'

2. Particular Problems Associated with Applying ERISA Preemption

Analysis to MCOs.

As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, a number of questions related to
MCOs remain unaddressed by the courts. Because of this, the typical ElUSA preemption
See Pilot Life.suwa note 3, at 52.
89 See Richardson, anote 6, at 705 (that the essential goal of HMOs, cost-containment, requires HMOs

to retain a certain degree of control over the provision of medical care, and that 9 502 complete preemption

analysis becomes swamped in uncertainty when it begins with recognition of MCOs' dual
roles as healthcare insurers and providers.
First, it is unclear whether MCOs wiIl ultimately be held to be insurers or entities
outside of the insurance industry. For example, the Fifth Circuit has twice preempted any
willing provider statutes because they applied to ~

~

0In each
s .case~the ~statute was

held to fail the third prong of the Pireno test under the savings clause, because the statute

was not directed exclusively to the insurance industry. in contrast, the Fourth circuit9'
and a federal district court within the Sixth

have held that such a statute is

saved, even though it is directed MCOs.

In particular, the district court in Ex rel. George NichqLr II noted that the
differences between traditional insurers and HMOs are insufficient to establish that a
statute regulating both is not limited to entities within the insurance industry. Citing SEC
v. Variable Annuity Lve ins.,93 the court warned that insurance is an evolving institution,

and that courts should not undertake to freeze the concept of insurance.
Second, it is unclear whether MCOs will eventualIy be held to be employment
benefit plans. As discussed above, the deemer clause prevents states fiom regulating
employee benefit plans, as opposed to the insurer providing the plan. Thus, a finding that

would apply to state law claims challenging the ability of HMOs to contain costs through its structural
characteristics such as utilization review).

See CIGNA Health Plan,
91

note 55; Texas Pharmacy Ass 'n, supra note 55.

See Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aema Health Management, 995 F.2d 500,502 (4th Cir. 1993).
-

"

Ex re]. George Nichols I[ 14 F.Supp. 2d 991 (W.D. Kent. 1998).

93 359

U.S. 65, 71 (1959).

>- .

MCOs are insurers rather than employment benefit plans, would remove the danger of
preemption under the deemer clause.
Because of their dual role, MCOs can be termed both a plan for the provision of
health benefits, and the insurer providing the plan. ENSA itself is not particularly
helpful on this point, only defining employment benefit plans as the "provision of
?

benefits for contingencies such as illness, accident, disability, death, or
Brooks Richardson argues persuasively that MCOs are not employment benefit plans, but
rather simply the means by which employee benefit plans provide the benefit of
affordable healthcare coverage.95 In Travelers, the U.S. Supreme Court also appears to
have implicitly recognized that HMOs are not employment benefit plans, since it noted
that employee benefit plans could choose to "purchase insurance policies or HMO
memberships."96 If lower courts take notice of this language, this question, at least
should be resolved.
Third, it is unclear whether mandated minimum benefits imposed on MCOs
constitute a regulation of benefits, or a regulation of benefit plans. A finding that
mandated minimum benefits such as the prudent layperson standard are regulation of
benefits could hypothetically cut the Gordian knot of ERISA preemption, under Halifax.

94

$ 3(1), 29 U.S.C. $ 1002(1).

9s

See Richardson,

note 6, at 702-704

Su~ra.note 37, at 1679. However, it does need to be kept in mind that these statements were made in the
context of "relate-to" analysis. The lower courts may decline to apply the principle in the context of savings
or deemer analysis. Additionally, the Court's reference to insurance and HMOs as two separate entities
further complicate analysis. Ideally, the ,Courtshould have made it clear that MCOs and HMOs are the
"other insurers" referred to in § 5 14(b)(2)(B) (deemer clause).
%

In that case the Supreme Court held that only laws relating to employee benefit plans, not
those relating to employee benefits, are preempted.97
However, these analytical difficulties are not likely to be resolved by the courts
soon. Confusion has continued in the lower courts even as to those issues that have been
clearly resolved by the Supreme Court. For example, the Court indicated in 1988 that

"run of the mill torts" such as medical malpractice would not be preempted. 98
Nonetheless, a number of courts have held a variety of such torts to be preempted since
then.99 Furthermore, there are a number of questions that have not yet reached the
Supreme Court that have given rise to conflicting circuit interpretations, such as the case

of the any willing provider statute described above. Accordingly, it is not realistic to
expect the lower courts to resolve these issues, at least not in the prompt, systematic and
comprehensive fashion which an issue as prominent as healthcare demands.

V. CONCLUSION AND FORECASTING.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the U.S. Congress has to confkont this
issue squarely. Analysis has demonstrated that no state healthcare reform effort can be
clearly secure fiom federal preemption in today's confused legal environment.
Furthermore, even if the courts were inclined to radically revamp preemption analysis as

97 See Ft. Halifax,
note 37, at 7. But see note 89, s u ~ r a(that regulation of an HMO's cost
containment mechanism could be preempted § 502).

98

See Mackey v. Lanier CoIiection Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988).

See e.a. Settles,
note 39 (fiaud and
note 39 (fraud and misrepresentation); Elsesser,
misrepresentation);Santitoro, anote 40 (breach of fiduciary care); Kuhl,
note 38 (tortious
interference with contractual relations); Corcoran, ~?lpranote 42 (negligence); Jass,
note 43 (medical
malpractice);Dukes, supra note 43 (medical malpractice).
99

to MCOs, it would necessarily be done on a piecemeal basis, as appropriate issues were
presented.

That the courts themselves are frustrated by the impasse of legislative inaction is
evidenced in the memorandum opinion of Andrew-Clark v. ~ r o v e l e r s . 'The
~ ~ judge
there acknowledged that ERISA remedies were inadequate in a day where 75% of

Americans are insured through MCOs, and he clearly wanted to find for the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, he took judicial notice of all the federal bills pending regarding patient
protection, and concluded that Congress was aware of the problem and that it was their
lack of action causing the problem. He ended h s opinion with, "WHO CARES? DO

YOU?"
The only viable solution to today's impasse is legislative action. Such legislation
could go one of several routes. First, Congress could institute nationally mandated
minimum benefits and patient protections, such as the prudent layperson standard among
others. This would have the benefit of prohibiting the multiplicity of conflicting
legislation that EFUSA preemption ultimately seeks to prohibit.10' However, there is
considerable resistance to federal encroachment onto areas of traditional state police
power such as insurance regulation and health and welfare laws. This is evidenced by the
failure to mandate such benefits to date, despite widespread recognition of its necessity.
Alternatively, Congress could amend ERISA to permit state law actions for injury
or death,'02 and to provide that no state law will be preempted so long as the state law

loo984

F.Supp. 49 (1997).

'*I

See TraveIers, s u ~ r anote 37, at 1677.

'02

See e.g. 1998 H.R.1415, Patients' Access to Responsible Care Act,

4(a).

doer not actually prohibit the application of ERISA's substantive provisions.'03The
problem with this is that it would permit employee benefit plans to purchase different
benefits according to varying state law.
Despite their problems however, such legislation is the only thing that will permit

future MCO regulation, in a day when such regulation is sorely needed. Absent some
kind of reform along these lines, the public cannot be guaranteed access to reasonable

emergency care without fear of preemption under ERISA jurisprudence.

'03

See e.g. 1998 S . 356, Access to Emergency Medical Service Act,

5 3(0.

